That’s why I don’t think it makes a lot of sense to see virtues as the foundation of ethics. And if the virtues did not do good, then we wouldn’t consider them virtues, so I think that you can’t really decide what is a virtue without having some other values that you’re trying to promote. If we talk about virtue ethics - and I think virtues are important - it seems strange to make virtues the foundation of ethics because surely the point of virtuous behavior is that it does good for others and for oneself. And people will have different intuitions on those matters. That all becomes very controversial and there seems to be no way of resolving that except by appeals to intuition. When we try to say that they are the foundation of morality, we’re talking about something a little bit more mysterious: where do these rights come from, which beings have them, what are the rights that we have. When we talk about duties or rights as the basis of morality - and I do think that we have duties and that beings have rights - I don’t think that that’s the foundation of morality. And that’s something that we can all see and understand. It deals with things that we’re all aware of - like the desire to avoid suffering or to enjoy pleasure. PS: I think the utilitarian view is the most straightforward ethical view. Could you explain why you prefer a consequentialist approach rather than appeals to ethical duty or cultivation of virtues? HPR: You’ve chosen a utilitarian framework to advance your arguments against meat eating. But where we have similar interests, for example, the interest in not feeling physical pain - if we assume that there are similar amounts of physical pain being felt - then the status of animals should be one of equality. That may be an interest that will override any interest that animals have. This doesn’t necessarily mean the interests of animals are the same as ours, and it may be that we have some interests that have greater weight than any comparable interest of animals, for example, interest in planning our life and living out our life over many years, which, I assume, non-human animals do not have the capacity to do. But we need to be clear that when we’re talking about equal consideration of interests, we are talking about similar interests - we can only give equal consideration where we have similar interests. Peter Singer: We should assign the status of equal consideration of animals’ interests. In your view, what moral status should we assign to animals? Harvard Political Review: Peter, you are known for popularizing the term “speciesism” in your book “Animal Liberation,” and you’ve been one of the greatest advocates for ending animal cruelty. This interview has been edited for clarity. Often hailed as the world’s most influential living philosopher, Singer has authored a dozen books, including “Animal Liberation,” and most recently, “Why Vegan?” Decamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University.